by aml | Oct 21, 2021 | Uncategorized
The recent financial scandal called “Pandora Papers”, is the result of a journalistic investigation conducted by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists . The research has allowed the world to learn about thousands of offshore companies linked to entrepreneurs, managers, politicians and criminals around the world, created to ensure anonymity. These legal entities are the so-called shell companies.
These companies do not have any operational activity and their assets consist exclusively of cash and/or cash equivalents (e.g., shareholdings). They often have no employees and no operational headquarters. Their sole purpose is to prevent the identification of the beneficial owner and the assets held in the company itself (essentially for the purposes of tax avoidance and money laundering).
Corporate decision-makers, internal auditors, compliance and anti-fraud professionals should pay particular attention to these legal entities, identifying them and then implementing controls to mitigate the risks arising from relationships with such counterparties.
Today we look at the complex relationship between shell companies and the beneficial owner, in the context of combating and preventing money laundering.
THE PANDORA PAPERS: WHAT ARE THEY?
The Pandora Papers were revealed on October 3 by an international journalistic investigation based on 11.9 million documents relating to assets registered offshore in territories where there are particularly lax regulations regarding taxation.
The Pandora Papers have involved 35 world leaders and hundreds of the richest and most powerful people on the planet as well as various government officials.
There are at least 90 countries involved in a period ranging from 1996 to 2020.
WHY HAVE THE PANDORA PAPERS BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL CASE?
Over 600 information professionals worked for two years to sift through 2.9 terabytes of data contained in thousands of documents, emails and spreadsheets, and as many as 14 financial services companies leaked the data behind the Pandora Papers, based in so-called tax havens (British Virgin Islands, Monaco, Panama, Singapore and Switzerland).
In these tax havens – “sunny places for shady people”- according to the definition of anti-money laundering experts, corporate taxes are low or non-existent and make it very easy to open shell companies created for the purpose of tax evasion or avoidance: tax evasion is one of the many “predicate offenses” of the crime of money laundering.
WHAT IS A SHELL COMPANY?
At the heart of the three big leaks – the Panama, Paradise and Pandora documents – as well as for many others , there is a single variable in common : the shell company – used by wealthy people and tax evaders to hide their activities from citizens, tax authorities and law enforcement.
Shell companies have a common characteristic considered a unique and appreciable virtue: they are anonymous.
THE THREE PURPOSES OF SHELL COMPANIES.
Shell companies is used for these three purposes:
1) to shield the real identity of the Ultimate Beneficial Owner, i.e., the beneficial owner, while ensuring their control over the company and its assets: anonymous shell companies.
2) circumvent the labour laws of the country where the main activity is carried out: letterbox companies.
3) to centralize the activity of financing or holding of the group, especially in the case in which it implements a very aggressive fiscal planning: Special Purpose Entity.
HOW SHELL COMPANIES ARE SET UP.
In order to maintain anonymity, the constitution of a shell company always takes place with the support of an advisor, who deals with both the constitution and often the subsequent management of the company.
There are several websites of companies that offers “offshore company” package; a service that makes setting up a shell company easy, fast and affordable.
The name of the legal representative, director, registrant or agent in a shell company’s corporate charter corresponds to the name of the advisor who has set up and/or is managing the company.
Often these advisory-companies set up a number of entities before a new customer knock on their door, to be able to provide a background to these so called “shelves-companies”
In this way, an experienced analyst should be able to locate the name of the advisor on any search engine and see if it can be traced back to a professional firm/consulting firm operating in that sector
A further analysis that could be carried out to acquire further useful elements to determine the type of company and to understand if the same refers to an advisor, is to search on the Internet for information regarding the telephone numbers and/or the e-mail domain, if reported in the company’s visas. Often what is declared as the headquarters or office will correspond to an address or address where the advisor company is also present.
Let us look at what other elements might be:
Vague or meaningless business names.
Generally, the name of a shell company is very vague or meaningless.
This type of choice could be the result either of a strategy of anonymization by the UBO (the Ultimate Beneficial Owner), in order to eliminate any traces of traceability or it could be the case of companies already pre-established by the advisor to which either progressive company names or very generic and vague company names have been given.
Legal headquarters in locations inconsistent with the stated business.
The address where the company is located is another important element in identifying the type of company.
It is fundamental, in order to discover the existence of a shell company, to investigate the address of the company in order to understand the type of property in which it has its registered office and/or exercises its activity.
Moreover, another very common element is represented by the presence of more companies registered at the same address.
To verify this possibility, it is possible to carry out a search by address on any search engine or on the various paid databases (and not) available on the market.
Absence on the web.
Generally, a shell company is not present on the web, both in terms of news, content and advertisements, and in terms of the website, as it does not carry out an operational activity and would not need to.
This aspect does not always correspond to the truth because, in some cases, a shell company may need to be present on the web to demonstrate an apparent operational activity.
THE GENESIS OF THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REGISTER.
One of the tools for combating the use of shell companies as a shield for hiding and laundering illicit proceeds is the Register of beneficial owners.
Let us analyze its regulatory genesis and its operation.
The establishment of the Register of Beneficial Owners was introduced by EU Directive 2015/849, which provided for a National Central Register for each Member State (interconnected with those of the other Member States) in which data on the beneficial owners of companies and other legal entities, trusts and related institutions are collected.
The transparency and the possibility to know of data concerning beneficial ownership was profoundly changed by EU Directive 2018/843, that changed the provisions on access to the Register.
As a result, firm regulation in favor of the Authorities and obligated parties:
a) Access to the data of companies and other legal entities was provided “in any case” in favor of the “public”;
b)Access to the data of trusts and related institutions has been provided for in favor of any natural or legal person requesting access, subject to the demonstration of a legitimate interest;
c) The possible exceptional exception on the grounds of serious risk to the beneficial owner is confirmed, extending it to access to information regarding trusts and related institutions.
THE REGULATION ON THE INTERCONNECTION OF DIGITAL REGISTERS.
On March 22, 2021 the Implementing Regulation no. 369/2021 of the Commission, concerning the interconnection between the national central registers of UBOs (Ultimate Beneficial Owner), in line with the IV and V Directive on AML, came into force for the member states of the European Union – and therefore also for Italy.
The Regulation has established a general register called with the English acronym “BORIS” (Business Registers Interconnection System) which, through the interconnection between national business registers, provides a single public access for all member states to information relating to beneficial ownership, in accordance with European anti-money laundering legislation.
THE SITUATION OF THE REGISTER OF BENEFICIAL OWNERS IN ITALY.
In Italy the adoption of the National Registry has suffered a setback, as a result of the Council of State’s censure of the MEF Decree that should have established it.
New initiatives from the Ministry will come in the months ahead.
The analysis of the statements made by the Client for the actual ownership of a legal entity is a key step in determining and managing AML risk.
Even if there are declarations from national beneficial ownership records, the entity subject to AML regulation is required to validate these declarations through a counter-audit.
With Cheope you can automate the screening for beneficial ownership, with documentation and analysis to demonstrate due diligence. Contact us to learn more about the service dedicated to the identification of the beneficial owner in Italy and abroad.
Each company can advantage from the right tools.
Cheope match strong ability in data providing, both official and investigative, with a focus to the Client’s need.
We can provide official evidences and investigative focus, linked together by a strong and clear reporting.
Our AML and CFT screening Service advantage from expertise and deep knowledge of the legislative frame.
And when you need assistance, CHEOPE’ staff is ready to support you directly from the headquarters in Lodi, Viale Milano 40.
Get in touch with us; we will empower together your AML process.
by tech@webheroes.it | Mar 24, 2021 | Uncategorized
The need to have accurate and updated information useful to trace the ultimate beneficial owner represents a cornerstone in the due diligence process, for any entity that want to verify reliability and reputation of its counterparties (customers, suppliers, clients).
Identifying the beneficial owner means knowing the identity of the actual ultimate beneficiary of service or manufacturing company.
The identification of the beneficial owner makes possible to understand whether, at the head of a company or a chain of companies, there are subjects involved in illicit activities who screens their ownership thanks to shell companies or trust.
From this point of view, both the national legislation and the EU legislation upstream, dedicated to countering the money laundering and terrorist financing, has always put particular attention to the beneficial owner.
The problem identifying the ultimate beneficial owner
The biggest problems in identifying the beneficial owner arise when the legal entity is not controlled directly by a natural person largely than 25% (direct ownership principle).
In this case, two paths appears:
- Move up the chain of control of the company searching for natural persons with a weighted shareholding of more than 25%. At this stage, it is important to verify the congruity of the information released by the subject and carefully assess the reason for possible discrepancies. in this last case the client’s risk profile can be significantly increased.
- If no natural person is directly or indirectly the owner of a percentage of more than 25%, it is necessary to verify the existence of persons who can control or exercise a dominant influence in the general shareholder meeting, by acquiring official evidences that can represent a proof of certain powers or influences.
If no subject like these can be traced, the subjects with powers of administration or management of the company can be considered as actual owners; this is a rather frequent case, where no natural person is identified.
These days, the issue of the AML “beneficial owner” has become extremely topical, as from 22nd March 2021 the regulation introducing the BORIS system – acronym for Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System- came into force.
The new BORIS system is a centralized research service that makes available the beneficial ownership information across European nations , following the EU Directive 2015/849 (Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive)
The characteristics of the BORIS system
The BORIS system – Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System- is part of the European Union’s ambitious intent to put in place an increasingly extensive digitalization of the various sectors of justice and cross-border cooperation. This perspective arises from the need to strengthen the AML/CFT framework at EU level and, more specifically, the customer due diligence procedures adopted by obliged entities.
The objective is to ensure effective monitoring and recording of beneficial ownership information.
BORIS consist of a decentralized system that interconnects the nationals central registers of beneficial ownership and the European e-Justice portal through the European central platform established by Article 22(1) of Directive (EU) No. 2017/1132.
Therefore, the BORIS system shares the same platform with the Business Registers Interconnection System (“BRIS”) of Member States, which instead provides cross-border public access to information on companies and their branches established in other Member States, thanks to electronic communication between national business registers.
Who can access the BORIS system
The regulation first identifies the so-called “qualified users” who can access the BORIS system.
These include:
- without any restriction, the national Financial Intelligence Units (in Italy UIF – Unità di Informazione Finanziaria);
- the competent Authorities, i.e. the public authorities assigned responsibilities, for various reasons, in the fight against money laundering or the financing of terrorism – in Italy the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the supervisory authorities of the sector, the Guardia di Finanza operating through the Nucleo Speciale Polizia Valutaria the Anti-Mafia Investigative Directorate, the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate, the Judicial Authorities (in accordance with their institutional attributions) and the authorities responsible for combating tax evasion (according to methods of access suitable for guaranteeing the pursuit of this purpose);
- in the context of customer due diligence, the obliged parties.
BORIS users will be able to query the systems via the registration numbers of companies, trusts and other legal entities.
The national registration number and the company registration number is important to make a correct query.
The Regulation provides the option for Member States not to indicate the national registration number for trusts or related legal entities; the exemption applies only for a period of five years from the date the BORIS system becomes operational.
Each state will have the option of expanding the minimum mandatory information with additional information.
Specifically, states will require trustees of trusts to maintain adequate, accurate, and current information about the beneficial ownership of the trust. This information will include the identity of the “trustee”; the custodian (if any); the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries; and other natural persons with effective control over the trust.
The Register of beneficial owners in Italy
As far as the establishment of the Register of beneficial owners in Italy is concerned, everything is still on stand-by. With provision no. 458 of March 19, 2021, the Council of State suspended the adoption of its opinion on the decree-draft created by the Minister of the Economy and Finance.
The importance of identifying the beneficial owner
Identifying the beneficial owner is one of the most effective actions to understand the reputation of the client, whether it is a matter of business interests or AML compliance.
This action therefore affects multiple parties:
- Businesses: assessing commercial reliability involves being able to verify the negatives associated with the counterparty. From this point of view, knowing the beneficial owner behind the company requesting supplies means knowing the REAL OWNER, in order to understand the negativity associated with the same, previous experience and business reputation; going beyond the shielding offered by an Italian or foreign company, which may present more or less transparent structures.
- Professionals: Customer due diligence is one of the most difficult anti-money laundering requirements for professionals. The AML screening applies to both new clients and the existing clients.
- Those Companies subjected to anti-money-laundering legislation, as part of their client due diligence activities.
Always identify the beneficial owner with our “ARP” software: Cheope’s investigative advantage
Cheope Risk Management is able to provide, within a highly efficient suite of aml services, the identification of the beneficial owner following two main focus:
- Interpretation of recent legislation together with knowledge of several different cases;
- Direct access to all the relevant information sources, to produce documental evidences useful to attest the ownership following the main ownership principle.
A.R.P. allows to activate the interaction between different types of risk scores (external; internal, others), in order to provide a synthetic indicator of risk, fully traced and certifiable in its components.
A.R.P. manages even the most sensitive situations, thanks to the possibility of integrating, where necessary, targeted investigations to assess the income, equity and reputation profile of the subject.
Each company can advantage from the right tools.
Cheope match strong ability in data providing, both official and investigative, with a focus to the Client’s need.
We can provide official evidences and investigative focus, linked together by a strong and clear reporting.
Our AML and CFT screening Service advantage from expertise and deep knowledge of the legislative frame.
And when you need assistance, CHEOPE’ staff is ready to support you directly from the headquarters in Lodi, Viale Milano 40.
Get in touch with us, we will empower together your AML process.
by tech@webheroes.it | Feb 17, 2021 | Uncategorized
The Bank of Italy’s anti-money laundering surveillance activity highlights over 113 thousand reports in 2020, for an associated value of transactions reported that reaches 5 billion euros.
These, in brief, are the elements that emerged during the hearing of the FIU’s Director Claudio Clemente last January 28 at the Anti-Mafia Commission of the House and Senate:
- a specific experimental alert introduced, able to highlight any anomalies in the financial statements of companies with high demands for public funds;
- published a list of alerts dedicated to screen the criminal infiltration in the real economy;
- closer monitoring of the transfer of tax credits is being introduced and, to this end, professionals will be introduced in the asseveration phase;
- There will be greater controls and checks on online transactions.
Criminal infiltration: a new specific indicator introduced
The action of organized crime takes place in two stages.
According to the FIU, in a first phase, attempts have focused more on the medical sector and the procurement of security devices.
In a second phase, hypotheses of infiltration in enterprises and attempts to misappropriate public funds destined to support the economy appears as simulated operations aimed at pre-establishing the requirements for access to funds.
The instruments used are those of false or misleading tax declarations with the attainment of undue VAT refunds, transferred abroad.
The illicit amount from the offence is then reintroduced in Italy in cash or through the sale of company shares: this total value is not reflected in the consideration reported in the sale deeds.
The vigilance activity of the FIU focus now on the financing assisted by public guarantees, provided to Companies through the experimental use of an indicator of crime infiltration risk.
After an accurate analysis of the balance sheet published by Companies involved with organized crime, the Authority has highlighted a number of common situation that occurs in these criminality-linked companies: this had led to more accurate risk indicators, to be applied in any circumstance where a company requires a public financial support.
Controls on non-refundable funds and transfer of tax credits
The FIU knows the importance of targeted controls on the operations of those subjects who access the benefits provided by the emergency legislation, such as financing assisted by public guarantee and non-repayable contributions.
For tax credits transfers and in particular the real-estate “Superbonus”, the risks connected with the fictitious nature of the credits have been identified. According to the anti-money laundering task force at the Bank of Italy, the role of professionals in the asseveration of tax credits is an important part of crime countering.
According to the FIU, there is the risk “that illicit capital is used to purchase tax credits with the aim of laundering them”. It will therefore be necessary to monitor carefully operations in this sector, especially in the case of “credits acquired in large numbers”.
Pandemic and suspicious transactions
In 2020, the number of reports attributable to attempts at fraud in the sphere of emergency healthcare amounted to 2257. The majority of these (1502) come during the second half of the year, with a sharp increase (from 667 million to 5.2 billion) in the amounts of the proposed transactions.
In addition to these alerts, which are directly attributable to the effects of Covid 19, the FIU recorded an increase in alerts concerning suspicions of abuse of public financing, financial abuses, usury and the use of pledge policies.
Each company can advantage from the right tools.
Cheope match strong ability in data providing, both official and investigative, with a focus to the Client’s need.
We can provide official evidences and investigative focus, linked together by a strong and clear reporting.
Our AML and CFT screening Service advantage from expertise and deep knowledge of the legislative frame.
And when you need assistance, CHEOPE’ staff is ready to support you directly from the headquarters in Lodi, Viale Milano 40.
Get in touch with us, we will empower together your AML process.
by tech@webheroes.it | Jan 27, 2021 | Uncategorized
In Italy, a country shaped by its culture for food and eating, restaurants and bars moves 86 billion euros a year (FIPE 2019 estimate – Federazione Italiana Pubbblici Esercizi ), of which a great part is collected in cash.
For this reason the sector is among mafias’ favorites for criminal investments.
The pandemic and the closures of bars and restaurants until March 5, 2021 (according to the provisions of the Prime Ministerial Decree of January 14th 2021), brings a strong contraction for traditional HO.RE.CA sector, together with its Partners and Stakeholders.
Part of the restaurant industry face the risk of selling its business-soul to the devil-mafia and consequently for cosa nostra, ‘ndrangheta, camorra and other criminal organizations, the economic crisis represent the best moments to reinvest illicit money. The tremendous volumes of cash from illegal activities makes easy to acquire ownership or control of those legitimate Companies dealing with financial troubles; even just to “set a foot” inside an unsuspected Company.
A risk now stronger
The restaurant industry recognize the risk together with their partner from the food industry: this is what Coldiretti stated on September 2020 before the Justice Commission of the National Chamber of Deputies.
The report of Coldiretti (the largest association representing and assisting Italian agriculture) is based on the Semi-annual Report of the DIA (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia) to the Parliament ; the report highlights the situation where five thousand restaurants lies in the hands of crime and the agro-food industry is becoming one of the priority areas of investment for the organized crime.
The turnover affected by criminal ties, goes “from the field to the table” and is simply dizzying since catering, agriculture, livestock farming and food distribution means 24.5 billion euros.
Lack of liquidity is a burden for restaurateurs’ shoulders
The lack of liquidity affecting many economic activities now expose these same companies to the risk of usury.
According to Coldiretti, crime takes possession in a number of companies part of the agro-food chain: from the fields to the shelves, destroying competition and the free market.
For the food industry, the organized-crime infiltration directly threaten quality and safety of production, with a potential boomerang effect to the image and the Made in Italy brand.
Password: camouflage
Organized crime is able to protect the financial power grown from illegal activities, by moving as articulated financial holdings, within which the restaurants represent efficient covers used to shield the identity of real owners and the origin of capital.
The operations led by Authorities reveals the interests of criminal organizations in the agro-food sector and specifically in catering in its various forms, from franchising to exclusive premises, from bars and trattorie to luxury restaurants and fashionable “clubs”.
Lombardy stand as proof
Lombardy stand as proof, to testifythe risk of usury and extortion against companies in the provinces of Milan, Monza and Lodi as a fact: this is part of the analysis led by the Union of Commerce of Milan and the Mine Crime platform.
Money laundering as part of Customer risk management.
The infiltration of organized crime within the economic system is fought with determination by the forces of law and order and in particular by the Guardia di Finanza.
The situation may let us thinking that we can’t prevent this risk but the philosophy adopted by the authorities shows that we can play a relevant part in fighting against illicit business partners in the food industry and HO.RE.CA sector.
Companies dealing with the HO.RE.CA sector, while assessing the financial and credit risk linked to its Customers, can detect at the same time the reputational risk linked to both Companies and Persons: in few word, you can understand if a new partner has previously exhibited fraudulent or illegal behavior.
The Credit Risk Manager is the right subject to apply the most effective, rapid and economical screening to detect reputational and fraud risk.
Each company can advantage from the right tools.
Cheope match strong ability in data providing, both official and investigative, with a focus to the Client’s need.
We are able to provide official evidences and investigative focus, linked together by a strong and clear reporting.
Our AML and CFT screening Service are shaped by our expertise and the constant attention to legislative frame.
And when you need assistance, CHEOPE’ staff is ready to support you directly from the headquarters in Lodi, Viale Milano 40.
Get in touch with us; we will empower together your screening process.
by tech@webheroes.it | Dec 9, 2020 | Uncategorized
Banca d’Italia is the authority in the banking sector and countering the money laundering is one of its tasks.
B.I. helps the banking industry with researches and suggested procedures; both aimed to help the detection and management of the AML risk with growing impact.
The FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit – is the independent authority dedicated to countering the money laundering and was established by the Bank of Italy, with the Decree 231 of 2007.
On November 10th 2020 the FIU published an official communication on web site, with an updated description of some behavioral-anomaly indicators, which could outline a business conduct at high risk of money laundering.
The four anomaly schemes
In concrete terms, four anomalous behaviors related to the phenomenon of money laundering are outlined below:
1. Use or issue of invoices for non-existent transactions (società cartiera or “ fake company”)
This scheme specifically concerns a fraudulent declaration through the use of invoices or other documents for non-existent transactions; and the issuing of these invoices.
Therefore, the characteristic are the following: the total or partial non-existence of the operations; the over-invoicing; operations linked to subjects other than the real ones.
To these purpose, the companies involved are often set up for the sole purpose of issuing non existing invoices; they often operates without employees, or real offices structure ; often they do not pay taxes as well (so-called “cartiere”).
The FIU identifies the following business sectors as most at risk: construction, trade in motor vehicles, goods with technological content, foodstuffs, road transport, fuels, logistics, precious metals, cleaning and maintenance, ferrous materials, consulting and advertising activities.
2. Intra-community VAT fraud.
Intra-Community VAT fraud is a phenomenon closely linked to the tax fraud described in Schedule A: two complementary sides that match in a common illicit conduct.
Similarly, to what happens when issuing invoices for non-existent transactions, the intra communitarian VAT fraud involves the “cartiere” companies as well.
The illegitimate company exploits the principle that intra-Community trade VAT is applied in the State of destination of the goods: so they purchase goods from a subject residing in another European country without applying tax and, subsequently, resell them to another national operator at prices lower than the average market prices, without paying the VAT charged to the transferee.
The FIU has found that the goods involved in such fraud, in addition to being of high unit value and usually non-perishable, are often technological and, more generally, easily transportable and widely consumed; and are of course subject to ordinary VAT rates (i.e. motor vehicles, fuel and oil products, IT products, mobile telephones, household appliances).
3. International tax fraud and other forms of international tax evasion.
International tax fraud and other forms of international tax evasion takes place in areas of direct taxation: from there, the assets are transferred abroad.
The fictitious transfer of residence as well, to countries with more favorable tax regimes allows the undue benefit of lower taxation, as well as undue exemptions or tax savings.
The offences described above is often carried out thanks to “shell companies” or “conduit companies”, which do not have an effective organizational structure and whose presence is justified solely for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage through them. The illicit transfer of resources abroad often take place thanks to innovative instruments and alternative investment, appropriate to remove any traceability of such resources to national authorities.
4. Operations connected with the transfer of fictitious tax credits and other undue uses
This pattern involve the operations linked to the assignment of fictitious tax credits. The assignment of receivables due from the tax authorities, in fact, makes it possible to obtain liquidity in a shorter period than that necessary for the disbursement of the relative reimbursement.
The assignments may be subject to fraud, linked to the fictitious nature of the assigned receivables and the undue compensation of the same with tax debts, social security charges and premiums actually due from the assignee companies. Generally, the consideration for the assignment is considerably lower than the nominal value of the receivables and the related payment flows in a manner that is particularly advantageous for the assignees.
When to trigger the reporting obligation?
The obligations to report suspicious transactions are contained in articles from 35 to 41 of Legislative Decree no. 231/2007 ; in the same document is stated that AML Officers send an SOS without delay to the FIU when they:
- Know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering or terrorist financing operations are in progress or have been carried out, or just attempted; or that in any case the funds, regardless of their amount, come from criminal activity;
- Verify the frequent or unjustified use of cash transactions, even if for amounts below the limit in force at the time.
Anyway, the presence of those behaviors described by the FIU does not obligatory justify the SOS report: the subjective and objective circumstances must be linked by logical and temporal principles, to be effectively related to the hypothesis of fiscal offence.
As represented in the UIF Communication, tax evasion and money laundering often match together, since tax offences are often included in a wider criminal context.
Each company can advantage from the right tools.
Cheope match strong ability in data providing, both official and investigative, with a focus to the Client’s need.
We are able to provide official evidences and investigative focus, linked together by a strong and clear reporting.
Our AML and CFT screening Service are shaped by our expertise and the constant attention to legislative frame.
And when you need assistance, CHEOPE’ staff is ready to support you directly from the headquarters in Lodi, Viale Milano 40.
Get in touch with us; we will empower together your AML process.
by tech@webheroes.it | Jul 8, 2020 | Uncategorized
“..the mafia is the best example of capitalism we have.”
Marlon Brando about his experience with The Godfather.
On July 1st 2020, the FIU presented the 2019 Annual Report: its Director Giovanni Clemente notes how the 350 Suspicious Transaction Reports (“STR”) received confirm the increasing anomalies in health care contracts and cash movements.
A contribution to this number of STR comes from non-banking financial intermediaries and the gaming sector.
Possible suspicious conducts according to the FIU Newsletter n.30
FIU’s Newsletter n°30 provides some clarifications about business sectors and situations that could entail new and significant risks for the economy.
For conducts yet considered suspicious, the anomalous behaviors connected had been better analyzed and described, making it more easy to screen; and the STR easier to triggered.
What are the “anomaly indicators”?
The anomaly indicators emerge from certain operations or behaviors of the client that appear anomalous for that kind of Subject: a sort of instruction that facilitates the risk assessment related to money laundering or terrorist financing.
Below we describe the four new trend:
1. HEALTH CARE COUNTERFEITING
The health emergency is cause to a sharp increase in the demand for medical devices, such as personal protective equipment, sanitizers and electro-medical equipment. The increase in demand is matched by the supply of counterfeit products, which do not comply with the CE marking, does not meet standards, are of inferior quality or even do not exist at all.
One first risk-alert relates to the experience of the health care product provider or producer.
In the last weeks, the Italian Ministry of the Economic Development on its own website has invited the consumers “to pay the maximum attention while purchasing such products: only the official and authorized channels of sale should be considered, and the consumer should consider the greater risks in buying via e-commerce. If you suspect the purchase of counterfeit products, you can send a report to the Ant counterfeiting Hotline, which will inform, where appropriate, the Guardia di Finanza and the Competition and Market Authority.
Speculative maneuvers and fraud on the needs for health-safety may appears as a proposal of subscription or sale of securities of Companies engaged in scientific research or in the production of electro-medical devices.
In this case too, the correct fulfilment of the customer due diligence obligations can prevent the risk. If the client provides poor documentation and information, this raises more than one suspicion.
2. FICTITIOUS NON-PROFITS
The fundraising through crowdfunding platforms involves the risk of founding fictitious non-profit organizations. In these situations, the obliged parties must pay particular attention not only to the objective profile of the foundraiser, but also to the effective use of the resources raised.
3. MAFIA INFILTRATION OF COMPANIES
A number of Companies after the lockdown and during these days appears weakened in their finances.
The situation shows soft spots to the organized crime, that is advantaging thanks to this opportunity: to become better rooted in the territory, to affiliate new subjects and to carry out usury.
The recommendations of the FIU underlines the importance of the ownership due diligence and of the company operations; to determine the origin of the funds and the real economic-financial purposes of the transactions carried out remains a corner stone for the due diligence process.
4. THE WEB AND THE CYBERCRIME
The FIU has highlighted how social distancing measures increases those risks linked to online fraud, identity theft, cybercrime and the use of electronic payment instruments in illegal contexts: from this point of view, the pandemic will probably bring both the cybercrime and the Authority’s action to a new level.
Each company can advantage from the right tools.
Cheope match strong ability in data providing, both official and investigative, with a focus to the Client’s need.
We can provide official evidences and investigative focus, linked together by a strong and clear reporting.
Our AML and CFT screening Service advantage from expertise and deep knowledge of the legislative frame.
And when you need assistance, CHEOPE’ staff is ready to support you directly from the headquarters in Lodi, Viale Milano 40.
Get in touch with us, we will empower together your AML process.
